And The Solution Is....

The insolubility (at least from the U.S./Georgian perspective) of the situation in Georgia has led to a lot of editorials that vary in emotion and tone, but say pretty much nothing. Today's entry by Jim Hoagland calmly fits the mold.

The question: Should the United States re-arm Georgia, and if so, at what level? That is, does Washington simply replace the U.S. weapons that Russian forces systematically destroyed in Georgia as a humiliating message for Americans? Or does the collapse of the Georgians this month mean that they need greater quantities and more sophisticated weapons to deter Russia in the future?

That may not present an agonizing choice for John McCain, given his muscular worldview and his sustained championing of Georgian links to the West and NATO. He will advocate riding to the rescue, although he is unlikely to call for an arms resupply while tensions stay at their current explosive level.

So we can expect lots of chest-thumping, but no real action, by McCain?

But seriously, how would McCain do more than chest-thump? How could we meaningfully rearm Georgia such that it could repel Russian forces or, as it had hoped, expel them from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, without creating a twenty-first century version of the Cuban Missile Crisis? Speaking geopolitically, why would it be wise, or even sensible to do that?

It makes little sense for Obama to try to out-hawk McCain on Georgia. He cannot do so convincingly. Instead, he must show how his sustained advocacy of diplomatic power can work in shoring up the fragile and imperfect democracy in Georgia.

What does Hoagland suggest, to achieve that? Oops. That's where the editorial ends.

Making Loud Noises....

Whatever you think of the Georgia conflict, who started it, the proportionality of the response, the excessive claims by both sides... we've now settled into a new status quo. Russia has recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and has made clear that it will militarily defend them from any effort by Georgia to reassert its authority over those territories. It wasn't difficult to see this coming - it was one of the things Russia warned the west about when it opposed the independence of Kosovo.

And now Russia has made its position clear. The Russian people support its actions, and it has no shortage of support within the territories themselves. The West is making angry noises, but Russia's not going to back down. Why not? It doesn't want to, it doesn't need to, it does not expect any serious consequence from its actions, and it fears looking weak-kneed if it backs down in the face of angry western chest-pounding. The Washington Post lectures,

Those in the West who persist in blaming Georgia or the Bush administration for the present crisis ought to carefully consider those words -- and remember the history in Europe of regimes that have made similar claims. This is the rhetoric of an isolated, authoritarian government drunk with the euphoria of a perceived victory and nursing the delusion of a restored empire. It is convinced that the West is too weak and divided to respond with more than words.

Perhaps the Post should take note, a "perceived" victory is one that doesn't exist in reality. Russia scored a bona fide military victory in Georgia. As far as the suggestion that Russia is wrong to believe that the West will not respond with anything more than words... why should it believe otherwise? More to the point, I think Russia is prepared for the possible imposition of some feeble economic sanctions, and doesn't much care. Who believes that the West is going to take action that might increase the price of oil and gas? (Strangely, I don't see any hands raised.)

The Post's ominous conclusion,

If nothing is done to restrain it, it will never release Georgia - and it will not stop there.

Ah, the glorious slippery slope. As it implied back when it opposed Kosovo's independence, its primary interest was in the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and so far there's no reason to believe that they have greater designs on Georgian territory. Nor does there appear to be any sign that Russia's about to invade any other nation. I realize that closing with ominous statements can seem compelling, but to transform the slippery slope from illogic the claim should be grounded in some sort of reality. What nation does the Post see as under imminent threat from Russia?

More to the point, what does the Post propose to do about it? Send in the Marines? Here's what their news department suggests is in the works:

"Sanctions are being considered and many other means as well," French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said in response to a question at a news conference.

"We are trying to elaborate a strong text that will show our determination not to accept (what is happening in Georgia)," he said. "Of course, there are also sanctions."

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed such talk, noting that Kouchner had also suggested recently that Russia might soon attack Moldova, Ukraine and the Crimea.

"But that is a sick imagination, and probably that applies to sanctions as well. I think it is a demonstration of complete confusion," Lavrov told reporters in Tajikistan.

So the west is "considering" sanctions and mulling over what sort of condemnatory text will be strong enough. They sure know how to hit Russia where it hurts.... What about U.S. and U.K. diplomats?

"There is a Russia narrative that 'we were weak in the '90s, but now we are back and we are not going to take it anymore.' But being angry and seeking revanchist victory is not the sign of a strong nation. It is the sign of a weak one," said Daniel Fried, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs.

"Russia is going to have to come to terms with the reality it can either integrate with the world or it can be a self-isolated bully. But it can't be both. And that's a choice Russia has to have," Fried said.

* * *

"They are kind of giddy. They will need to sober up," said a senior U.S. official, insisting on anonymity because his remarks were diplomatically impolite. "When they sober up, they will see that it is not the U.S. that has done things to them; it's that they have done things to themselves."

Similarly, in a speech yesterday in Kiev, Ukraine, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband said: "Today Russia is more isolated, less trusted and less respected than two weeks ago. It has made military gains in the short term. But over time, it will feel economic and political losses."

It actually seems like Russia, buoyed by high prices on oil and gas, is prepared to assert itself as a regional power, and fully expects to be able to act as such while continuing to engage and trade with the west. And when it comes to maintaining the flow of Russian gas into Europe, who do you think is going to blink first?

As you might expect, there's another way of looking at things. When I first read this editorial, my reaction was that it didn't really say anything that wasn't self-evident, and that the author was far too self-satisfied with the outcome. But I guess I was wrong.

For nearly two decades, while Russia sunk into "catastroika" and China built an economic powerhouse, the US has exercised unprecedented and unaccountable global power, arrogating to itself and its allies the right to invade and occupy other countries, untroubled by international law or institutions, sucking ever more states into the orbit of its voracious military alliance.

Now, pumped up with petrodollars, Russia has called a halt to this relentless expansion and demonstrated that the US writ doesn't run in every backyard. And although it has been a regional, not a global, challenge, this object lesson in the new limits of American power has already been absorbed from central Asia to Latin America.

But what of diplomatic isolation?

There has been much talk among western politicians in recent days about Russia isolating itself from the international community. But unless that simply means North America and Europe, nothing could be further from the truth. While the US and British media have swung into full cold-war mode over the Georgia crisis, the rest of the world has seen it in a very different light. As Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore's former UN ambassador, observed in the Financial Times a few days ago, "most of the world is bemused by western moralising on Georgia". While the western view is that the world "should support the underdog, Georgia, against Russia ... most support Russia against the bullying west. The gap between the western narrative and the rest of the world could not be clearer."

The conclusion is pie-in-the-sky, but consistent with the overall tone of the piece:

For the rest of us, a new assertiveness by Russia and other rising powers doesn't just offer some restraint on the unbridled exercise of global imperial power, it should also increase the pressure for a revival of a rules-based system of international relations. In the circumstances, that might come to seem quite appealing to whoever is elected US president.

Does he really believe that?

What Happened in Georgia

At least insofar as the start of the conflict, it's anybody's guess. Well, anybody's except Saakashvili's and, perhaps, a few people in the U.S. government. For now, it's denial time:

During a private dinner on July 9, Ms. Rice’s aides say, she warned President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia not to get into a military conflict with Russia that Georgia could not win. “She told him, in no uncertain terms, that he had to put a non-use of force pledge on the table,” according to a senior administration official who accompanied Ms. Rice to the Georgian capital.

It's hard to imagine that Saakashvili would ignore such a direct warning. It's really hard to believe this:

“This caught us totally by surprise,” said one military officer who tracks events in the region, including the American-Georgian training effort. “It really knocked us off our chairs.”

There are some understandably skeptical responses to that claim:

If the Pentagon and CIA were also caught flat-footed by Russia's response, as the McClatchy Newspapers' crack Washington bureau is reporting, then we have to ask: Why are we spending $55 bllion a year on intelligence? What are we getting out of it?

* * *

As easy as it is to believe that the CIA, etc., blew another huge event, I find it impossible to accept that not one of the 127 Pentagon advisors in Georgia, including Special Forces and intelligence contractors, were clueless about Tblisi's intent -- and preparations - to move into South Ossetia.

Similarly,

It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s intentions. The second is that the United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion.

If this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically, Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, the Europeans need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them. Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow’s calculus was that this was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for months, as we have discussed, and they struck.

* * *

By invading Georgia as Russia did (competently if not brilliantly), Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security.

The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk.

The article elaborates that Russia has the U.S. over a barrel, as the U.S. needs their cooperation in its conflicts in the Middle East, particulary in relation to Iran.

Meanwhile, McCain is talking loudly and waggling a tiny stick. He's prepared to move forward with NATO membership for Georgia... "at the right time", whenever that is. (He's implicitly stating the obvious - It's not right now, or even at any future time we can presently predict.) He wants to boot Russia out of the G-8, as if that's going to happen. He seems to be admitting that the Iraq war has left the U.S. impotent in the Caucasus: "We don't have, I think, right now, the ability to intervene in any way except in a humanitarian, economic way, and do what we can to help the Georgians".

What we do seem to be getting is a lot of really silly analysis. For example, in The Jerusalem Post:

After the war, the status quo ante in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is no longer tenable and the policy choices facing Russia in the region - official annexation or recognition of their independence - would not be accepted internationally. Moreover, Russian troops can no longer be perceived as an evenhanded peacekeeping force, and this may bring pressure for their replacement with either UN or some other more neutral peacekeeping troops.

Internationally, Russia's use of force could in the long run completely undermine Russian credibility when it speaks against the use of force in Iran or condemns potential future confrontation between Israel and Hizbullah (in 2006, Russia condemned in the harshest terms Israel's "excessive use of force").

Finally, as Israelis know well, bombing and invading small countries never looks good on TV in the West, however justified it might be. In the court of public opinion, Russia has already lost, something the independent Russian media was quick to acknowledge. Some in the US are already calling for a American boycott of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, and that may perhaps be only the beginning.

In terms of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it seems pretty clear that Russia is mostly interested in excluding Georgian troops from those territories, wants a commitment that Georgia won't again attempt to subdue them by force, and won't be inviting in international peacekeepers. Evenhandedness? Who thought Russia was evenhanded before this flare-up of the long-simmering conflict? And what does it really matter? Few countries view Israel as "evenhanded" in its administration of the West Bank; that doesn't mean international peacekeepers will ever take over that role.

And gee whiz... Russia won't have credibilty when it criticizes other nations for the excessive use of force? As if it did in the first place? And people around the world will think of Russia as being a bully against weak neighboring states? That'll be a first....

This piece seems mostly designed to fill column inches:

In the meantime, could it be that Russia, petro-confident and irredentist, seeking to reverse the record of the past two decades, is careering toward another 1989 or 1991? Will it heed the lessons of the Soviet era? What will happen if it does not? Will the North Caucasus break out of Moscow's grip? Will the Far East turn into a Chinese colony? Will the West once again confront the prospect of Moscow's former satrapies suddenly becoming major nuclear powers? Will the specter of Russian "loose nukes" keep haunting the West?

It's written like the ending of a 1950's serialized cliffhanger. And Russia, we're told, may be in for a "hard landing" if it doesn't learn from the lessons of history:

A decade [after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan], there would be no more Warsaw Pact. Europe would be sending humanitarian aid to Russia. The Soviet military would be defeated in Afghanistan. What caused all that? We are still not quite sure.

I sure hope the Russians are taking notes.... (But if you really want silly analysis, turn to Richard Cohen, who apparently isn't even slightly interested in internal consistency. I'd do a "slash and burn" on it, but the pickin's are just too easy.)

Georgia On My Mind

My initial reactions are pretty much in line with Dan Froomkin:

Back in 2005, speaking before a crowd of more than 150,000 exuberant Georgians cheering "Bushi! Bushi!", President Bush made a promise to the people of that former Soviet republic: "The path of freedom you have chosen is not easy, but you will not travel it alone. Americans respect your courageous choice for liberty. And as you build a free and democratic Georgia, the American people will stand with you."

So where was Bush as Russia launched a major military attack against Georgia? Monkeying around with the U.S. women's volleyball players - and otherwise amusing himself at the Beijing Olympics.

This is not to suggest that Bush should have sent in the Marines. But his impotence in the face of such a gravely destabilizing move highlights not only his personal loss of stature, but how deeply he has diminished American authority on the world stage generally and, particularly, in the eyes of Russia.

and Josh Marshall, including the thought that those who essentially want us to go to war with Russia are insane. I am still wondering, did Saakashvili truly believe that the U.S. would back him up militarily? Because if he didn't, it's hard to make any sense of his decisions and tactics.

For more detailed perspectives on this conflict, check in with Eunomia or LGM. (Even if you don't agree with all the conclusions, you'll learn something.) Via lies.com, there's also this excited analysis of the conflict in the voice of a fictional "war-nerd". And there's this news roundup from more traditional sources.

The Stupid News Story Of The Day

Presidential Candidate X says "I'm the most qualified on issue A". Presidential candidates Y and Z deny that.

Er, no kidding.

Obama, describing what he would want in a running mate:

"I would like somebody who knows about a bunch of stuff that I'm not as expert on," he replied. "I think a lot of people assume that might be some kind of military thing to make me look more commander-in-chief-like. Ironically, this is an area - foreign policy is the area where I am probably most confident that I know more and understand the world better than Senator Clinton or Senator McCain."

Clinton's response:

She laughed, actually, before responding on Fox News. "Well I’m somewhat shocked by that since I don’t see any evidence of it," she said. "This is kind of hard to square with his failure to ever have a single policy hearing on the only responsibility he was given, chairing the European and NATO subcommittee the foreign relations committee.

"I don’t know," she continued. "I’m speechless. Making an assertion like that belies the facts and the record."

Okay, Candidate Clinton, what are the facts and what is the record? Laughter doesn't cut it - please give us the specifics. No puffery this time around, please.

McCain's proxies answer:

Blair Latoff, a spokeswoman for the Republican National Committee, said in an earlier statement, “Perhaps in an effort to one-up his own ridiculous assertions about John McCain’s record, Barack Obama laughably claimed to have more foreign policy experience than Senator McCain. Even by Obama’s standards, this is a horrifyingly false claim without a shred of supporting evidence. Perhaps the junior Senator from Illinois should focus on explaining to voters what exactly his foreign policy experience is before comparing it to John McCain’s wealth of experience on the issue.”

It's fascinating to me that the Republican response to Obama is to lie about what he said, particularly as they're accusing him of misrepresenting McCain on the "100 years in Iraq" quote. Obama didn't say a word about McCain's much touted experience. He indicated that he believes he knows more about foreign policy issues than John "Iran is training al-Qaeda" McCain. He suggests that he has a better understanding of the world than John "100% behind the invasion of Iraq" McCain. You know, because experience is not a synonym for either knowledge or understanding.

Although Obama didn't raise the issue, it may also be noted that experience does not automatically translate into good judgment.

In any event, this is good campaigning by Obama. He is confronting his opponents squarely on the issue where they claim to have superior qualifications. He's couched it as an opinion, so there are no facts or foibles of memory that can be disputed. So far, his opponents' responses have been, dare I say, pathetic. Didn't they see this coming? (See my joke campaign song recommendation for Obama.)