Save Us From the Speechwriters

First it was David Frum, not a stupid man but one predisposed to fatuous assertions; next Michael Gerson, the nation's dumbest syndicated columnist. Now erupting, from deep within the bowels of the White House... Marc A. Thiessen.

When President Bush left office on Tuesday, America marked 2,688 days without a terrorist attack on its soil.

Except for anthrax. And the Beltway sniper (close enough to terrorism to test "homeland security", even if without a political objective). And, although certainly not a terrorist attack, the colossal screw-up after Katrina that let the nation know that, for years after 9/11, Bush and his administration were completely incompetent to handle any large-scale disaster on U.S. soil. And if we're counting days, the amount of time between the first attack on the World Trade Center and the end of Clinton's term was even greater, with no subsequent anthrax attacks to conveniently overlook.

Thiessen's goal here seems to be to defend Bush's record of torture, disregard of the Constitution, and indefinite confinement of suspects without charges or recourse to the courts. It's one of those arguments where Bush's adherents wish to be taken on faith. Khalid Sheik Mohammed refused to talk until he was tortured, and the information gathered was so valuable that only Bush and those with top security clearances, like... his speechwriters have been trusted with the intimate details. But it allowed the government to claim to have prevented terrorist attacks that may have been planned for U.S. soil, and a few of those directed at overseas targets, so, you know, shred the Constitution and all hail Bush. And shame on Obama for describing torture for what it is.

It's astonishing that Bush's defenders are so quick to defend the use of torture, but so scared of the word itself. Have they no courage in their convictions? No, that qualification isn't needed. Have they no courage?

President Obama has inherited a set of tools that successfully protected the country for 2,688 days - and he cannot dismantle those tools without risking catastrophic consequences.

You know, it's like potato chips. You hold a guy without charges or access to the courts, torture him, make sensational claims about what you supposedly learned through torture (but refuse to substantiate them)... and how can you possibly stop at just one? C'mon Obama - taste the forbidden fruit. You'll like it....

On Tuesday, George W. Bush told a cheering crowd in Midland, Tex., that his administration had left office without another terrorist attack. When Barack Obama returns to Chicago at the end of his time in office, will he be able to say the same?

Again, that's a claim Clinton could have made - more honestly. But that's not the point, is it. Thiessen wants to set a stage where any further attack on the U.S. vindicates Bush and redeems his miserable record. From his tone, it almost sounds like Thiessen is hoping for an attack, just so he can snivel, "I told you so." Even though it would vindicate nothing in his argument and, quite possibly, reflect and result from the failure of the Bush Administration's policies.

In 2007, President Bush revealed intelligence that Osama bin Laden had told al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq to form a cell to conduct attacks inside the United States - then the surge drove them from their havens and set back those plans.

In 2004, President Bush (via Condoleezza Rice) revealed that in 2001 they sat on intelligence that Osama bin Laden was determined to attack targets within the United States. I wish he'd taken that, you know, 1% as seriously as the notion that a planned terrorist cell ostensibly to be based in U.S. occupied Iraq had similar intentions.

Walking... or is it Crossing a Fine Line

Thomas Friedman expands his "suck on this" psychology to the Palestinian territories, arguing that Israel's principal goal in its recent armed conflicts is to destroy civilian infrastructure, and to frighten and punish civilians:

Israel’s counterstrategy was to use its Air Force to pummel Hezbollah and, while not directly targeting the Lebanese civilians with whom Hezbollah was intertwined, to inflict substantial property damage and collateral casualties on Lebanon at large. It was not pretty, but it was logical. Israel basically said that when dealing with a nonstate actor, Hezbollah, nested among civilians, the only long-term source of deterrence was to exact enough pain on the civilians — the families and employers of the militants — to restrain Hezbollah in the future.

Glenn Greenwald responds that Friedman's approach to asymmetric warfare sounds an awful lot like terrorism.

The war strategy which Friedman is heralding - what he explicitly describes with euphemism-free candor as "exacting enough pain on civilians" in order to teach them a lesson - is about as definitive of a war crime as it gets. It also happens to be the classic, textbook definition of "terrorism."...

Other than the fact that Friedman is advocating these actions for an actual state rather than a "subnational group," can anyone identify any differences between (a) what Friedman approvingly claims was done to the Lebanese and what he advocates be done to Palestinians and (b) what the State Department formally defines as "terrorism"?

I'm not endorsing Friedman's interpretation here. As is his wont, he's describing what's happening in his own mind and projecting it onto the rest of the world. But really, it's a deplorable position and one likely to result in even more blowback.

Friedman yammers about how he believes Israel's infliction of pain on Lebanese civilians has deterred Hezbollah from launching missile attacks during Israel's Gaza invasion but, in giving a rather skewed history, he glosses over the fact that Hezbollah and Hamas have different political agendas, and also are of different religious sects. And why even if we assume that Hezbollah has been "deterred" from small attacks, that means next to nothing if hostilities again break out between Israel and Lebanon. As Dan Larison has repeatedly argued, if you choose a strategy of disproportionate response, you may deter smaller conficts, but at a significant potential cost:

If every incident, no matter how small, results in a large-scale response, there is nothing – short of their physical annihilation (which may or may not be achievable) – to keep those whom you are trying to deter from making ever larger and more destructive attacks. They will attempt to do the maximum of damage before the inevitable large-scale response comes. The more disproportionate the response now, the less restrained an enemy will be by deterrence in the future.... The disproportionality of response seems effective in pummeling your adversary this time, but it is only truly effective as a deterrent to others if the adversary is wiped out or permanently disarmed (an objective that would currently require an even more disproportionate response than Israel has so far employed).

Perhaps Friedman hasn't been paying attention, but by all appearances Hezbollah has rearmed and has better, longer-range rockets and missiles and better defenses than ever before. And it's political standing in Lebanon seems undiminished. For what use does Friedman imagine Hezbollah has amassed its new arms, and how much of a popular uprising have the battered civilians of Lebanon managed to present in order to prevent its rearming? Meanwhile, let's look at an important international relationship - Israel's relationship with Turkey. How his all of this going over in Turkey? (Don't you hate it when facts get in the way of armchair chest-thumping?)

Citing Scripture

In terms of the invidious citing, distorting, and fabricating scripture to justify the unjustifiable, this remains "right up there":

In Gaza a few years ago, I conducted an on-camera interview with the political leader of Islamic Jihad, Mohammed al-Hindi. With his finely trimmed beard and gracious manners, he symbolized the modern - and moderate - Muslim man.

But his interpretation of the Koran suggested something else. "Where," I asked, "does it say that you can kill yourself for a higher cause? As far as I know, the Koran tells us that suicide is wrong."

Through his translator, the physician assured me that the verses endorsing suicide operations could be found "everywhere" in Islam's holy book. I challenged Dr. al-Hindi to show me just one passage.

After several minutes of reviewing the Koran, then calling for help on his mobile, then looking through companion booklets, he told me he was too busy and must go. "Are you sure you're not pulling a fast one on me?" I asked. He smiled, clearly understanding popular American lingo. "I want to know that you're telling me the truth," I repeated.

The essay continues exactly as you should expect, but not from reading the popular media, listening to western political leaders, or listening to most religious leaders.

Of course, most people - not just Muslims - could use more independent thinking. This point grabbed me at the Gaza office of Mohammed al-Hindi. As we left, I asked his translator why Dr. al-Hindi would give me an on-camera interview, knowing that he could not find a single verse to prove his claim that the Koran justifies suicide operations.

The translator replied: "He assumed you were just another dumb Western journalist." Reporters from the West had never asked this veteran terrorist the most basic of questions: Where is the evidence for what you do in God's name?

It's widespread, abject, unforgivable ignorance that leads dolts like George W. Bush to glorify suicide bomers as "homicide bombers", "jihadists" or "Islamofascists", rather than emphasizing their suicides and the distance between their actions and Islam.

Bush Didn't Make Any Mistakes, But Obama Should Learn From Them

As part of his continuing series of columns in which he demonstrates his eagerness to be invited to Bush's new Dallas home for supper, Michael Gerson shares more thoughts on the incoming Obama Administration.

Part of the appearance of security is rooted in seven years without additional terrorist attacks in America - itself a triumph against violence. It is difficult for a leader to take credit for a negative achievement - for the absence of failure. But here credit is due.

Apparently we're talking about international terrorism, in which case the seven years Gerson sees as warranting credit to Bush represent almost as much time as the eight year period between the first and second attacks on the World Trade Center. Gerson's correct that the passage of seven years doesn't justify complacency, but so far Bush's track record isn't better than Clinton's. If a terrorist attack were to occur in 2009, is Gerson more likely to pen a column describing the failure of Bush's policies, or to accuse Obama of taking his eye off the ball? As if Obama had warnings from the outgoing administration about the threat of al-Qaeda, and a memo on his desk declaring that they intended to attack within the United States, but focused on other priorities?

But there's another way to look at this: After supposedly ramping up to deal with large-scale terrorist attacks, the consequence of which could mirror the effects of a natural disaster, how did the Bush Administration perform? If anything should move us away from complacency, it's that track record.

Gerson sees the Congressionally approved tools used to combat terrorism as non-controversial, but finds room to learn from Bush's excesses:

Yet some methods designed for exceptional cases, such as waterboarding, were ethically disturbing and eventually counterproductive - causing self-inflicted ideological wounds in a largely ideological struggle.

I had almost forgotten that torturing people is "ethically disturbing". It's good to have a "compassionate Christian" around to remind us of that.

And there is little doubt that some administration claims of executive power invited a judicial backlash and undermined the power of future presidents.

Others might argue that the level of judicial deference to Bush is more problematic than the few cases that went against him. Gerson's right that future Presidents will have to remember that their office has limits, and those limits will at times be enforced by the courts. But he's confused about the source of those limits, as they in fact arise from a document the President is sworn to uphold, the Constitution. Gerson continues to explain the consequence of Bush's extra-constitutional actions:

If the administration had sought congressional backing for military commissions in 2001, and later for rules to hold combatants, the resulting legal framework would probably have been upheld by the courts - and would probably have been closer to administration goals than the eventual result.

So had Bush respected the Constitution and separation of powers, and acted accordingly, there would have been less litigation and the outcome would have been closer to what he wanted? That's the consequence Gerson sees from a "judicial backlash [that] undermined the power of future presidents"? The horror!

Gerson is apparently concerned that "enhanced" forms of interrogation won't be available to the CIA:

Or should the CIA be allowed to employ still-classified "enhanced" techniques short of torture? During his campaign, Obama promised the universal application of the Defense Department approach - but that is easier for a candidate than a president to pledge.

Sure, and Obama will have access to classified information that will help him make that assessment. But if we look at the interrogation techniques that worked in finding and killing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, not only was torture unnecessary, by all appearances it would have been counter-productive. If one is needed, the fact that the result of the investigation was a bombing run intended to kill al-Zarqawi is a reminder that warfare carries a very different set of ethical balances than peace. But it's one thing when you are forced to make tough decisions that challenge your values due to the realities of war, and quite another to repeatedly make ethical concessions out of loyalty to a particular politician or administration without examining the reasoning behind those policies or considering their efficacy.

The hardest issues concern detained terrorists. Guantanamo will and should be closed as a public diplomacy nightmare. Perhaps half of the detainees will be sent home, leaving about 100 exceptionally dangerous men.

Well, so far that doesn't sound very hard. Why, though, do we still have 250 detainees at Guantanamo if it's so easy to sort out the "really bad ones" from the rest, and to send the others home?

The Obama administration will need to decide on a format for trials - much improved but politically discredited military commissions, ordinary civilian courts or some kind of national security courts created by Congress and supervised by the federal judiciary.

But the administration will not be able to try everyone. Some detainees will be too dangerous to release but too difficult to convict in a normal court setting using unclassified evidence. And any president will need the ability to hold and question newly captured terrorists outside the procedures designed for American criminals.

The reality is that you're unlikely to find any of that 100 who cannot be convicted and sentenced to life in prison based upon less sensational charges that don't require public disclosure of classified evidence or investigative technique. Remember John Walker Lindh, who if convicted at trial could have received up to three life sentences plus an additional 90 years in prison? There are many charges that can be brought against those defendants that will prevent them from ever again stepping outside the walls of a federal prison.

But let's assume for a moment that there are a few whose trials would somehow require public disclosure of material that would undermine our continuing efforts to fight wars and combat terrorism. That no number of court orders or protective measures could allow a fair trial without disclosure of that information. What would Gerson suggest then?

Unless Obama returns to a simple exertion of executive authority, he will require congressional authorization to detain people.

So Gerson is suggesting that Obama can spare himself a lot of headaches and better protect the nation by eschewing Bush's unilateralism in favor of constitutional process?

And this will expose a major tension between the new president's military responsibilities and the views of supporters who believe that detainees should be held only in preparation for trial.

Assuming, in fact, it's necessary for Obama to request extraordinary power in relation to some of the detainees. But you know what? There aren't many Obama supporters who actually fit the description Gerson provides - there may not even be any. The vast majority of Obama's supporters have always acknowledged the reality of the situation. Extending habeas corpus rights to detainees held in U.S. prisons is not the same thing as saying "detainees should be held only in preparation for trial" - it relates to whether or not detention is justified. It's a check on abuses and the potential for abuses. You shouldn't have to be much of a student of history to understand why the Founding Fathers were sufficiently concerned about that potential that they inserted habeas corpus rights into the body of the Constitution.

Friedman's Constant Call for Muslim Protests

It's one of those days when Thomas Friedman phones in his column. Yes, again (and again, and again) it's "if only the Muslim world would take to the streets to protest Muslim terrorism" columns. It's not that in a larger sense he doesn't have a point - it would be nice if there were a greater outcry against terrorism within the Muslim world. But it's just plain silly for Friedman - a man whom I doubt has ever participated in the public protest of anything - to keep returning to this notion that the only meaningful Muslim reaction to terrorism would be their taking to the streets with torches and pitchforks.

Friedman complains that if Muslims take to the streets to protest offenses against other Muslims and their religion, they should take to the streets with the same vigor over crimes committed by other Muslims. We'll leave aside for the moment that nobody seems to actually do that - people sometimes take to the streets to protest the actions of their own government, but I can't recall a single instance, anywhere, of people of any religion taking to the streets to protest the actions of terrorists merely because they happen to share their faith or ethnicity. But let's pretend for the moment that Muslims are unique in that respect. Perhaps we should look at how somebody described protests in the Muslim world:

Where Islam is imbedded in authoritarian societies it tends to become the vehicle of angry protest, because religion and the mosque are the only places people can organize against autocratic leaders. And when those leaders are seen as being propped up by America, America also becomes the target of Muslim rage.

It's also worthy of note that those authoritarian regimes take advantage of what one might deem "fake issues" - things they don't really care about, but which stir up the people - as an opportunity to let the people take to the streets and vent rage that might otherwise be directed at the government.

But where Islam is imbedded in a pluralistic, democratic society, it thrives like any other religion.

That, apparently, is why Friedman doesn't call upon the Muslims of India to protest acts of terror by other Muslims. Although it would be easier for them to do so.

What would be the goals of the protests Friedman wants to see? Somebody once suggested,

Throughout history, successful social protest movements have had one thing in common - a clear, simple message and objective. Whether it was the women's rights movement or the anti-Vietnam-War movement, the mere uttering of the name immediately conjured up who the protesters were and what their objective was.

Friedman takes note of Pakistani expressions of concern, anguish and solidarity, but that's not enough for him:

But while the Pakistani government’s sober response is important, and the sincere expressions of outrage by individual Pakistanis are critical, I am still hoping for more. I am still hoping — just once — for that mass demonstration of “ordinary people” against the Mumbai bombers, not for my sake, not for India’s sake, but for Pakistan’s sake.

Why? Because it takes a village. The best defense against this kind of murderous violence is to limit the pool of recruits, and the only way to do that is for the home society to isolate, condemn and denounce publicly and repeatedly the murderers - and not amplify, ignore, glorify, justify or “explain” their activities.

What's the simple message that Friedman expects the protest to convey? "Hey, hey, ho ho, Lashkar-e-Toiba has got to go"? How many Lashkar-e-Toiba members does Friedman believe hang out in Islamabad? How many members of that group do you think care about the opinion of anybody in Pakistan who is not on board with their cause? A protest is going to change that?

The recurrent theme to Friedman's columns is his professed belief that, "Muslim protests against terrorism by Muslims would dry up the pool of recruits." The first problem is, Lashkar-e-Toiba isn't focused on the "three rivers of rage" that somebody sees as the basis of al-Qaeda-type terrorism. Its primary goals are territorial - ejecting India from Jammu and Kashmir. So in this context it's much less like the analogy Friedman makes, to protests against cartoons about Mohammed, and is more akin to the IRA - a conflict that was nominally "Catholic versus Protestant", but was in fact grounded in a territorial dispute. (Need it be said that Friedman never called for the world's Catholics to rise up in mass protest of IRA bombings in London, let alone argued that such protests would dry up the IRA's ability to recruit members?)

The second problem is that Friedman's calls for mass protest within the Muslim world is an assignment of collective guilt. He apparently sees all Muslims, whatever their sect or nationality - and perhaps especially those who live under autocratic regimes - as having essentially the same values, beliefs, and sympathies toward terrorism. Despite arguing that the roots of Muslim terror emerge predominantly from living under autocratic governments that keep their people "voiceless and powerless and prevent them from achieving their full aspirations in a world where they know how everyone else is living" and that Islam will peacefully thrive as part of a "Multi-ethnic, pluralistic, free-market democracy", his taking to the streets "solution" does nothing to address what he, himself, has declared to be the cause of the problem.

This leaves the question, does Friedman truly believe that the Islamic world is monolithic, such that a terrorist act by a Muslim is attributable to all Muslims unless it is denounced by a "mass demonstration of 'ordinary'" Muslims? That we should assume in relation to Islam (and only Islam) that if there is not a mass protest then there must be mass acceptance?

But at the end of the day, terrorists often are just acting on what they sense the majority really wants but doesn’t dare do or say.

Is this a dodge, "I don't believe that to be true of Islam, but the terrorists do?" If so, it's a distinction that gets past the biggest fans of this type of column. Oh, I know, it's not Friedman's fault if people misunderstand his columns and use them to advance anti-Islamic bigotry - but it's not something he's going to, you know, protest.

In short, Friedman is correct to call on the Muslim world, and perhaps particularly Muslim communities in the free world, to be much more vocal in deploring terrorism that is committed in the name of Islam. If you oppose terrorism that is being committed in your name, quietude is not the answer. If the Muslim communities of the world can take to the streets over blasphemy against Islam from outside of their faith, there's room for demonstration (in not in the form of protests, then at least in the form of public vigils) protesting blasphemy from within - the acts and attitudes of certain Muslims that suggest that terrorism and violence against civilians and "infidels" is legitimate under Islam. When it comes to condemning terrorism, the words of the Islamic community should be loud and sincere. And Friedman is correct that actions often speak louder than words.

At the same time, I disagree with Friedman's implication all terrorist acts committed by Muslims are rooted in religion and are attributable to the collective attitudes of all Muslims. He's also far too simplistic in his suggestion that the type of mass protest movement he demands would have any appreciable impact on terrorist groups, or that even if some protests occurred there would emerge a coherent, sustainable movement.

The type of attitude shift Friedman wants will have to start with the opinion leaders and religious leaders, particularly those within the Islamic communities that are most inclined to spawn terrorists. And it must be facilitated by the political leaders of Arab states - the same autocratic, non-democratic leaders who facilitate and benefit from the status quo that Friedman deplores and describes as the principal cause of Islamic terrorism. It really wouldn't hurt if the U.S. and the regimes of the Arab world started working to dry up the "three rivers of rage" that Friedman sees as the principal causes of Islamic terrorism.

The War on Terror, On Film

In a nutshell, Body of Lies opens well, and starts building an interesting story. Then it goes off on a dubious subplot that isn't very convincing and takes far too long to develop. As the subplot is crucial to the ending of the film - your understanding of the characters, their motivations and their actions - it is indispensable. Unfortunately, it makes the film a bit too long and at times tedious.

The film tell a story that focuses on human intrigue, an expanding network of dysfunctional relationships with Agent Ferris (Leonardo DiCaprio) at its center. That is, as contrasted with a lot of other modern films about the war on terror, it seems to be trying to put story ahead of politics. But make no mistake, this is a very political film, from its outset unapologetically asserting that the war on terror (efforts to fight terrorist cells and capture terrorist leaders) is crucial to the preservation of western values and freedoms. The Iraq war merits mention, but this film is about what its makers seem to see as the real "war on terror" - an often low-tech war with some high-tech components. There's plenty of double-cross and moral ambiguity.

As overt as the politics often are, as contrasted with a film like Babel or Syriana, the films largely avoids feeling like a condescending lecture or becoming lost in its convoluted plot. But you'll still get some elements of a political lecture, with characters dropping comments here or there describing how "torture doesn't work" (which isn't to say that those same speakers find no use for it) or that Islamic terrorism is predicated upon a misinterpretation of the Koran (while making it clear that you'll have no luck convincing the adherents of that interpretation that they've made a mistake).

I haven't read David Ignatius's book, but if the screenplay is any indication he's given a great deal of thought to the "war on terror", the mistakes we have made, and the reasons for our continued difficulties in identifying and stopping terrorist leaders and terrorist cells. This film sees great value in human capital (agents working in the field, and their building relationships with locals), and is often scornful of the U.S./CIA preference for surveillance technology that arose following the end of the cold war, as well as their treatment of the locals who risk their lives (or die) while working with or assisting field agents. In the film, Agent Ferris is morally elevated over his boss not because of what he does for those harmed or killed by his actions, but because he wants to offer assistance before indifferently accepting that it's not forthcoming.

But Ignatius is no Luddite - far from it. The film depicts whiz-bang, nifty keen technologies in all, or perhaps most of, their glory. While highlighting the limitations of technological surveillance, he also illustrates its usefulness, and showcases how even one or two people can orchestrate a massive disinformation campaign through the Internet.

Leonardo DiCaprio is well cast in this film, although the character he plays will be familiar to those who have seen his recent work. (His accent may change, but it's essentially the same character he played in Blood Diamond and The Departed.) His character is suited to his role. I suspect that Ridley Scott had fun with Russell Crowe, chubby and aged, commenting to DiCaprio at one point that a decade earlier he could have taken him in a fight. (Believe it or not, yes, it's almost a decade since Scott directed Crowe in Gladiator.)

Does Michael Gerson Actually Have An Area Of Expertise?

Or was he hire to present mindless prattle about whatever issue the Bush Administration deems important on any particular day?

It is a central argument of the Bush administration that the outcome in Iraq is essential to the broader war on terrorism - which is plainly true. When it comes to Sunni radicalism, the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are a single struggle. Al-Qaeda has latched on to local grievances, tribal conflicts and general chaos in all three nations to extend its influence.

So, basically, he's arguing that when we invade nations in the Middle East and South Asia, or ally with their dictators in order to advance our wars, we create havens for Al Qaeda? We shift Al Qaeda from the nations we're invading into our allied nations? Or into other nations we're invading? Seriously - what's his thesis here? If he's truly arguing that after five years of war we've transformed Iraq from being essentially al-Qaeda free to being a stronghold, and have meanwhile allowed it to expand its influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, how does he believe himself to be making an argument for continued (perpetual?) war?

But this argument, used to justify U.S. efforts in Iraq, cuts another way as well. Is America taking all three related insurgencies with sufficient seriousness?

Er, no, that's not the other way it "cuts". But thanks for trying.

Iraq, while consuming greater sacrifice, is now producing the most encouraging results. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is reeling.

But what does "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" have to do with your prior statements about Al-Qaeda? Michael Gerson - are you trying to perpetuate the lie that "Al-Qaeda" and "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" are the same organization? (Of course you are.)

To clear Sadr City block by block -- an area with 2 million people, most of them loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr -- would require divisions that do not exist. So the strategy is to kill or capture members of the "special groups" -- the Shiite equivalent of al-Qaeda - while engaging members of Sadr's movement who want to join the political process.

Ah, so it doesn't really matter that the fight in Iraq isn't against Al-Qaeda, because every insurgent group that poses a threat to U.S. forces or the Maliki government is an "equivalent of al-Qaeda". And we draw this comparison based upon... the fact that it's "scary" to compare them to Al-Qaeda? Seriously, Michael - what goals do the Shiite militias share with Al-Qaeda? To take but one small, obvious example, one of Al-Qaeda's stated goals is to draw us deeper into a battle in the Middle East. The Shiite militias opposed to the Maliki government are demanding that we leave.

Iraq's future -- and the future of American involvement in that country -- now rests with the Shiites. If many turn to politics, the nation's path will be shorter and easier. If many choose conflict, it will be tougher and longer. But the gains against al-Qaeda in Iraq, the other great destabilizer, cannot be denied.

And again, what do gains against "al-Qaeda in Iraq" have to do with al-Qaeda proper? Bin Laden's organization? Al-Qaeda was not even welcome in Hussein's Sunni-controlled Iraq. Assuming it were to happen, what delusion grips Gerson that he believes the Shiite militias will tolerate it once they control the nation?

Unsurprisingly, Gerson feels compelled to close with a retreat to the last refuge of a Republican Hack, the "Some Democrats" argument....

Some Democrats make an illegitimate argument: that we need to abandon Iraq in order to win in Afghanistan.

Here's an easy question for you, Michael: Which Democrats?

On the contrary, a loss in Iraq would make every front in the war on terror more difficult by providing terrorists a base of operations and boosting the morale and recruitment of every radical group on Earth.

Gerson's argument, of course, presupposes that the Maliki government Gerson was earlier praising as having "finally shown some fight against radical militias" and having "gained in political stature and regional respect" will fold like a cheap suit the moment U.S. forces start to withdraw. And it relies upon his continued prevarication that any organization that opposes the U.S. occupation or the U.S.-imposed Maliki government is comprised of "terrorists" who pose to the U.S. the same threat as Al-Qaeda.

Gerson's IQ would have to be somewhere below room temperature for him to actually believe that al-Qaeda proper, or even it's similarly named Iraqi counterpart, would be welcome in a Shiite state governed by somebody like al-Sadr.

In prescribing the same tired nostrums, hacks like Gerson never get around to addressing that key question: Who will control Iraq after we depart, and why should we believe that they have any interest in allowing their nation to be a "base of operations" for terrorists? If you have nothing to support that claim, do us this favor - admit that you're just making stuff up, then shut up and let the grown-ups discuss these issues without your interruptions.